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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Because this appeal involves a final decision by the Honorable Glen R. Dawson,
judge of the Second Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(3) and Rule 4, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
The record in this case will consist of the transcript of the January 14, 2002
hearing on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the video trial transcript, March 22, 2002, and
the sentencing transcript, May 13, 2002 as well as the pleadings, motions, and other
documents contained in the Record on Appeal. Citations will be as follows: to the
transcripts, "Trans. 1/14/02 p.," "Trans. 3/22/02 p.," and "Trans. 5/13/02 p.;" and to the
Record on Appeal, "Rec. p."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
As will be shown below, there was no allegation in this case that the bad checks
involved in the action were issued by Mr. Hopkins under any circumstances involving
dishonesty or moral turpitude. Rec. 104-05, 116 Nor did the State attempt to prove that
he or anyone affiliated with him obtained anything of value in exchange for the checks.
The only element of mens rea found by the trial court was that Mr. Hopkins knew
Cornerstone was having trouble with its checking account and that "any given check may
not be paid by the drawee." Trans. 3/22/02 205, Addendum at 43. Nevertheless, Mr.
Hopkins was convicted of a third degree felony under both subsections of Utah Criminal
6

Code § 76-6-505 and sentenced to a prison term, which was suspended on conditions of
probation, one of which was that he pay the two checks that did not clear the Cornerstone
account. Rec. 145-46.
These facts, and the conviction and sentence, raise the following issues on appeal:
1. Was the trial court's finding that Mr. Hopkins knew there was a problem with
the Cornerstone account such that "any given check may not be paid by the drawee"
sufficient to meet the requirements of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1)? This issue
was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 99, 108, 116, 118, 163-165; Trans. 3/22/02 188,
192, 199.
2. Did the lower court err by leaving out an essential element of the offense when
it refused to require any finding that the checks were issued for the purpose of obtaining
something of value? This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 100-02, 109-10,
167-71; Trans. 3/22/02 201-02.
3.

If not, is Utah Criminal Code §76-6-505 unconstitutional under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the
Utah Constitution's proscription against imprisonment for debt?

This issue was

preserved in the trial court at Rec. 100-02, 117, 135-137, 166-67; Trans. 1/14/021-%.
4. Does Utah Criminal Code §76-6-505(2) violate the Utah Constitution and the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution!
This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 102-104, 108-10, 114-18, 171-74;
Trans. 1/14/02 5-6.
7

5. Was Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees a defense to prosecution under
§ 76-6-505? This issue was preserved in the trial court at. Trans. 3/22/02 190-92, 194.
6. Did the trial court correctly avoid constitutional problems with Utah
Criminal Code §76-6-505(2) by implementing Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and
103? This issue was preserved in the trial court at Rec. 115, 174-75; Trans. 3/22/02 119.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All of these issues are questions of law and are reviewed on appeal for correctness,
with no deference given to the trial court's conclusions of law. Peterson Plumbing Supply
v. Bernson, 797 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The provisions of the United States and Utah Constitutions that Appellant believes
will be dispositive of the issues presented by this appeal are set out below:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 14 SECTION 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 16
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in the cases of
absconding debtors.
In addition, Appellant believes that Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) and (2),
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and § 76-2-102 and 103, and case law construing these statutes, will be determinative.
Those sections read as follows:
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) & (2)
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership,
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check or draft.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he
fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving the actual notice of the
check or draft's nonpayment.
Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof
of any culpable mental state.
Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-103
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
9

conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Similar statutory language is found in Utah Code Annotated § 7-15-1, and recent
case law interpreting that language will also be determinative. That statute reads in
pertinent part as follows:
Utah Code Annotated § 7-15-1
1) As used in this chapter:
(b) "Issuer" means a person who makes, draws, signs, or issues a check,
whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of:
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or
other thing of value; or
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent.
***

2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the check if:
***

(ii) the account upon which the check is made or drawn:
***

(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for
payment in full of the check...
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case raises questions about the interpretation and application of Utah's
10

criminal bad check statute. Does it apply to an issuer who is having financial difficulties,
who issues checks knowing that one or more of those checks may not clear, but warns his
employees of the situation then does everything in his power to clear the checks? Does it
extend to cases that do not involve an element of dishonesty or deceit, that do not involve
an effort by the issuer to obtain some personal benefit? Is the behavior of beleaguered
businessmen like Mr. Hopkins really criminal in Utah, and if so, can the Utah statute
survive constitutional scrutiny?
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The original Information (Rec. 1), the Amended Information (Rec. 17), and the
Second Amended Information (Rec. 66), charged the Appellant with a second degree
felony. Before the preliminary hearing, nine checks were involved totaling over $5000.
Rec. 68, et seq. However, at the preliminary hearing, it was demonstrated that all but two
of those checks had, in fact, been paid. Trans 3/22/02 4. The case was therefore bound
over as a third degree felony (Rec. 63) on the two remaining checks to Julie Vanisi (see
Rec. 145), which totaled $2219.85. Rec. 145.
Mr. Hopkins moved the District Court to dismiss these charges based upon: (1) the
lack of mens rea in the case; (2) the fact that no '"obtaining" was involved or even
alleged, and that there was no contemporaneous exchange in any case (the checks were
used to pay pre-existing debts); (3) the claim that Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is
unconstitutional; and (4) that prosecution of Mr. Hopkins, who was not personally liable
for the debts of the corporation that issued the check, was improper under § 76-6-505(2).
11

Rec. 97, et seq. The motion was denied {Rec. 123), but the lower court ordered that the
State had to prove some level of knowledge under Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and
103 in order to obtain a conviction under Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2). Trans.
3/22/02 199-20.
The case was set for pre-trial at which Mr. Hopkins waived his right to a jury trial
(Rec. 125), and the case was tried to the bench. Rec. 128,141-42. At the end of the trial,
the lower court made the following findings (see Addendum at 42-44):
(1) Mr. Hopkins "was the person who issued or passed each of these checks, had
authority to issue or pass them. And as the agent of the corporation did it..." Trans.
3/22/02 205.
(2) "The purpose of each of the checks at issue was a purpose set out in 76-505-1
and 2; that is, paying for wages, salary, labor." Trans. 3/22/02 205.
(3) "[W]ith regard to subsection 2 [sic], the issue is whether he knew it would not
be paid by the drawee. And as I review State' Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the bank statements
that show numerous bounced checks in December, January and February, as I review the
testimony that - that numerous employees were told that, you know, don't try to cash
this. Just deposit it. We're confident it will pass. That showed knowledge that there was a
problem. And I think it's sufficient to show knowledge that any given check may not be
paid by the drawee." Trans. 3/22/02 205.
(4) That, "with regard to these two checks, they were refused by the drawee."
Trans. 3/22/02 205.
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(5) That "the Defendant's conduct was knowing. It was also extremely reckless
with regard to the state of the business as testified to during the time at issue, February of
2001." Trans. 3/22/02 205-206.
(6) "I find that all of the elements of subsection 1 of 76-6-505 have been shown by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Trans. 3/22/02 206.
The lower court then went on to findings regarding Subsection 2 of § 76-6-505. In
that regard it found, in addition to the elements noted above:
(7) That "with regard to each of these two checks he had received actual notice of
the check's nonpayment." Trans. 3/22/02 206.
(8) "[H]aving that notice, he knowingly and recklessly failed to make good for
payment within the 14 days allowed under the statute." Trans. 3/22/02 206.
(9) And lastly, "I find all of the elements of subsection 2 have been shown by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Trans. 3/22/02 206.
Based on these findings, the lower court found that there was "a single violation of
76-6-505" and entered "a judgment of conviction to a third-degree felony." Trans.
3/22/02 206. Sentencing was scheduled, and the court hinted that it would be amenable
to a 402 motion to reduce the judgment of conviction from a third-degree felony to a
misdemeanor. Trans. 3/22/02 20. The State had no objection as long as the required
restitution was paid in full. Rec. 133, 141. That motion was brought subsequently, but it
was denied. Rec. 144. The reason given was that Mr. Hopkins, who was financially
incapable of making payments on the two checks, was thereby showing a refusal to take
13

responsibility. Trans, 5/13/02 15. Sentencing proceeded. It included an indeterminate
term in the Utah State Prison, not to exceed five years. This prison term was suspended
upon conditions of probation, one of which was that Mr. Hopkins pay the two checks as
restitution. Rec. 144-146. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant/Defendant, Richard Ramsey Hopkins, has no previous criminal
record.

Rec. 136; Trans. 5/13/02 9.

He had been a lawyer and was a seasoned

businessman. Trans. 3/22/02 148-49. In February 2001, he was President of Cornerstone
Publishing & Distribution, Inc., an LDS publishing company 0'Cornerstone"). Trans.
3/22/02 19, 154. During that month in particular, Cornerstone experienced severe and
unpredictable economic difficulties. Trans. 3/22/02 87-88, 135-38, 142-44, 164. These
started with the failure of Zions Bank to make good on promises to provide needed
capital in connection with Cornerstone's acquisition of Horizon Publishers in August
2000. Trans. 3/22/02 6, 128-29. To make up for Zions Bank's actions, Cornerstone
obtained some Accounts Receivable financing in September 2000 (Trans. 3/22/02 7,
130), but in February 2001, the unpredictable actions of the Accounts Receivable
financing company wreaked havoc with Cornerstone's cash flow. Trans. 3/22/02 8, 130,
132-33. As a result, though deposits were made prior to paydays and Mr. Hopkins fully
expected to be able to cover the checks issued (Trans. 3/22/02 155-56, 158, 165, 177),
and although previous bad payroll checks had been immediately covered (Trans. 3/22/02
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25, 73), availability of funds in the account during the month of February 2001 was
uncertain. Trans. 3/22/02 9.
Payroll checks were issued on the 10th and 25th, ten days after the end of the
payroll period.

Trans 3/22/02 23-24, 175. In February 2001, two such checks—the

largest ones (Trans. 3/22/02 167)—were issued to Julie Vanisi along with some seven
other checks to other employees. Mr. Hopkins told the employees of the company's
financial problems and that the money to cover these checks may not be available at the
time they were issued, but that, based on his experience with Cornerstone's cash flow and
given the company's sales (see Trans. 3/22/02 140) they could expect that them to be
covered or made good. The employees were told to deposit their checks into their own
accounts and allow them to clear through the Cornerstone account in the regular course of
banking business. Trans. 3/22/02 58, 60-62, 165, 167-68. The two checks to Julie Vanisi
were not deposited in the manner instructed (Trans. 3/22/02 65, 156-57) and they were
not made good by the time Cornerstone filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code in July 2001. Trans. 3/22/02 177-79.
As President of the corporation, Mr. Hopkins issued the checks or caused them to
be issued,1 but no evidence was ever presented to suggest that he benefited in any way
from issuing the checks (Trans. 3/22/02 202), or that benefits he received from
Cornerstone in any way prevented the checks from clearing or being paid (Trans. 3/22/02

1 Although, one of the two checks was not actually signed by Mr. Hopkins. Trans.
5/22/02,54,71, 123, 163.
15

175-76), or that he singled out any employee for mistreatment (Trans. 3/22/02 166-67), or
that he was trying to cheat anyone. Trans. 5/13/02 4, 10-11.
Mr. Hopkins offered to pay any fees or costs that might have arisen as the result of
issuing the bad checks, but that offer was ignored. Trans. 5/13/02 2-3. Instead, the trial
court's focus was entirely on collecting the two checks {Trans. 5/13/02 12-15),
irrespective of Mr. Hopkins' destitute financial situation {Trans. 5/13/02 16-17) or his
inability to make the checks good. Trans 3/22/02 177-79.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 must be strictly construed in favor of a

defendant.
2. The elements of the offense stated in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) are:
a. Knowing that the check will not be paid at presentment; and
b. Obtaining something of value must be the purpose of passing the check.
3. The requirement of "knowing it [the bad check] will not be paid" means the
defendant must:
a. Have specific knowledge about a particular check. It is insufficient to
know that one or two out of a group of checks may not clear.
b. The specific knowledge must be definite, allowing of no uncertainty. It
is insufficient to know that a check may not clear.
4.

The knowing and obtaining requirements combine to describe an act of

dishonesty or moral turpitude. Failure to find moral turpitude in the factual situation, as
16

in this case, decriminalizes the act of passing the bad check. Without moral turpitude as
demonstrated by both the knowing and obtaining requirements, that act was simply the
failure to pay a debt, which cannot constitutionally be punished by imprisonment.
5.

The obtaining requirement distinguishes the offense described in Utah

Criminal Code § 76-6-505 from the mere failure to pay a pre-existing debt, which is not a
criminal act. It requires that the bad check be the inducement for the exchange and that it
pass contemporaneously with the goods or services obtained by the issuer.
6. The language that expresses the obtaining requirement in both subsections of
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 cannot be interpreted, as the trial court did, in the
alternative. That is, it cannot be interpreted to require that the purpose of the transaction
is either to obtain something of value, or to pay for services. This is because:
a. The grammatical construction does not suggest an alternative reading.
Rather, it suggests that other things of value are meant to include payments for services.
b. To read the purpose language of the statute in the alternative creates a
dichotomy that is contrary to fairness and common sense. That is, a person can be
prosecuted for writing a bad check in payment of a pre-existing debt for services, but he
cannot be prosecuted for writing the same bad check if it is in payment of a pre-existing
debt for goods or money.
c. There is nothing to indicate from the legislative history that a major
change in the statutory scheme (the elimination of an essential element of the offense)
was intended by the addition of the language relating to payment for services.
17

d. Construction of the purpose language in the alternative is contrary to
holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in cases interpreting the identical language in Utah
Code Ann. § 7-15-1, and similar language in earlier amendments to § 76-6-505.
7.

Because interpreting the purpose language in the alternative creates a

nonsensical dichotomy, Due Process objections are raised under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
8.

Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is unconstitutional for the following

reasons:
a. The fourteen days after notice of dishonor during which the issuer can
pay a bad check and thereby avoid prosecution for the original act of knowingly writing
that bad check to obtain something of value turns the statute into one that focuses on
collecting the debt rather than punishing the offense.

Further, it establishes a

classification on the basis of wealth because offenders who are wealthy enough to cover
their bad checks are not prosecuted, while offenders who are not wealthy are prosecuted.
b. In this case, the application of both subsections of Utah Criminal Code §
76-6-505 was clearly aimed at collecting the debt. Thus, if Mr. Hopkins were sufficiently
wealthy that he could have paid the checks, he could have avoided prosecution or had his
sentence reduced.
c.

There is unfairness in holding a corporate representative personally

liable for a pre-existing corporate debt when it was the corporation that became unable to
pay the debt within fourteen days through no fault of the representative.
18

9. Disclosure to the payees of the checks that they could expect problems with
them negates any form of moral turpitude in this case and should have been a complete
defense to the charge.
10. The constitutional problems with Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) could
not be solved, as the trial court did, by imposing an arbitrary mens rea requirement under
Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-4-102 and 103. In any case, the trial court's finding the Mr.
Hopkins "knowingly and recklessly" failed to pay the checks with 14 days after he had
notice of dishonor does not amount to criminal intent of any kind.
11. Accepting the factual findings of the trial court and applying them to the
arguments above, the case must be remanded with instructions to dismiss it with
prejudice for the following reasons:
a. Mr. Hopkins did not know which, if any, of the checks in question
would not clear, and only knew that one or more "may not" clear, he did not have
sufficient knowledge to meet the knowing requirement of Utah Criminal Code §
76-6-505(1).
b. Mr. Hopkins was merely paying a pre-existing corporate debt when he
issued the checks and did not obtain any personal benefit, services, or money at
all, let alone in a contemporaneous exchange for which the checks were the direct
inducement. Thus, he did not meet the obtaining requirement of either subsection
of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505.
c. Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) is unconstitutional and that defect
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was not ameliorated by the trial court's use of Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102-03.
Indeed, both sections of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 are unconstitutional if
they are found applicable to the facts in this case.
ARGUMENT
I. KNOWING A CHECK "MAY NOT" CLEAR IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER § 766-505(1).
A. THE COURT MUST STRICTLY CONSTRUE THE STATUTE.
Obtaining goods or services under false pretenses, such as with a bad check, was
not a criminal offense under the common law. 264 Am.Jur.2d, False Pretenses. It was
made an offense by statute in Utah. Many other states have passed similar laws making it
an offense to obtain goods or services by passing a bad check. Regarding such statutes,
the court in Mullican v. State, 360 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1962) expressed the basic principle
of jurisprudence that applies to all of these statutes:
At common law obtaining money by false representation of a fact was
not a crime. [Citation.] This being true, many States, including ours,...early
passed statutes for the purpose of preventing perpetration of flagrant frauds,
and these statutes have been denominated,...as a false pretense statute [sic].
In construing these statutes their construction must be strict and nothing
which is not within the plain words of the statute will be given meaning
against a defendant, but there will be a liberal construction in favor of the
defendant. (360 S.W.2d at 38.)
Under this rule of statutory construction, the requirements of Utah Criminal Code
§ 76-6-505(1) and (2) must be liberally construed in favor of Mr. Hopkins.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE INCLUDE "KNOWING" AND
"OBTAINING," WHICH COMBINE TO SHOW DISHONESTY.
Regarding the elements of the offense, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in
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State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1986) held as follows:
The defendant was charged and convicted under § 76-6-505(1). That
section requires the State to prove that a defendant issued a bad check
knowing that it would not be paid by the drawee at presentment and that the
defendant issued the check for the purpose of obtaining something of
value. See State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis in
original.)
As stated by the Supreme Court in State v. Pfannenstiel, 22 Utah 2d 31, 448 P.2dd
346 (Utah 1968), this statute "offends against dishonest and promiscuous circulation of
phony paper."

The element of dishonesty is demonstrated in the two elements,

"knowing'" and "obtaining." It is present when one obtains something of value by issuing
a check knowing that it will not be paid. Both elements are essential to make the
transaction a crime, an offense involving dishonesty.
While the 1977 amendment to Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 removed the
necessity of proving intent to defraud {State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)), it
did not change these two elements (knowing and obtaining) nor the basic nature of the
offense. If these two elements (knowing and obtaining) are not found, the fundamental
dishonesty that marks the offense is absent, and there can be no conviction under Utah
law.
C. SECTION 76-6-505(1) REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE THAT A SPECIFIC
CHECK WILL NOT CLEAR.
The statutory language of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) states (emphasis
added):
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(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership,
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing // will not be paid by
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check or draft.
Strict construction of the bolded phrase reveals two requirements. First, the
knowledge must relate to a specific check. The word "it" refers back to the subject of the
sentence, "a check or draft for the payment of..." Thus, to be guilty of this offense, Mr.
Hopkins would have to have known that the specific checks issued to Julie Vanisi would
not clear. That is contrary to the evidence and inconsistent with the trial court's findings.
Mr. Hopkins knew the company was having problems with its account, and warned the
employees that they might experience problems so they should deposit the checks to their
own accounts and allow them to clear in the normal course of banking. These facts do
not imply knowledge that any particular check would not clear.
The second requirement imposed by this language is that the person issuing the
check must know it "will not be paid." These words admit of no uncertainty and are in
the future tense. Thus they require that the issuer must know a) that there are presently
no funds available to pay the checks, and b) that there will be no deposits made in the
future to cover the checks. The Utah statute does not include language requiring that a
check be good either at the time it is issued or at the time it is presented. The language
"will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee" focuses on
payment by the drawee, whether immediate or eventual.
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Thus, if a person believes their company's cash flow will cover a group of checks,
and that belief is patently reasonable as evidenced by the fact that most of the checks are
eventually covered, that person does not have the requisite knowledge defined by this
section of the statute. The most that can be found is exactly what the trial court did find,
namely that Mr. Hopkins knew that one or more of the checks "may not" be paid.
The plain words of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) do not make it a crime to
issue a check ''knowing it may not be paid." The language requires that the check be
issued "knowing it will not be paid." The words "may not" describe a situation in which
a person is just trying to pay his debts to the best of his ability. The words "will not"
describe a situation involving dishonesty.
D. CONSTRUCTION OF § 76-6-505(1) TO ELIMINATE THE ELEMENT
OF DISHONESTY WOULD MAKE IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A number of courts have held that a worthless check statute that does not include
fraudulent intent as an element of the offense may be invalid under a state constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt such as Utah Constitution, Art. I §16. In
People v. Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826 (Colo. 1972), the court stated that such a statute "could
be interpreted as nothing more than a collection statute which authorizes imprisonment
for debt" (494 P.2d at 831).
In Burnam v. Commonwealth, 15 SW2d 256 (Kentucky 1929), which has been
cited frequently by courts considering statutes that do not contain the element of intent to
defraud, the court decried such statutes, saying, "Bad faith or good faith, guilty intent or
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innocent purpose, the result is the same." It then noted that the giving of a bad check is
little different than the passing of an IOU or promissory note,2 because the position of the
creditor is not changed by reason of nonpayment. The court went on to say, "Can it be
seriously contended that failure to pay a note by reason of financial inability is a crime?
The barbarous practice of imprisoning one for a mere debt—the obligation not being the
result of wrongdoing—is a thing of the past" (15 S.W.2d at 257-258).
In Collin v. State, 168 SW2d 500 (Texas 1943), the court upheld a bad check
statute that contained an "intent to defraud" element against constitutional attack, noting
that it was constitutional because it was not the nonpayment of the debt that was being
punished but the fraudulent act of giving the check. The same result was reached in
Locklear v. State, 273 NW2d 334 (Wis. 1979).
It would appear from these cases that removing the "intent to defraud" language
from the Utah statute as an element of the offense could put the constitutionality of the
statute in question, unless strict adherence to the knowledge and obtaining requirements
is maintained/
In Utah, it is issuance of a check "knowing it will not be paid" that constitutes an
element of the offense, not the mere failure to pay the debt. The difference between the

2 The Burnum court notes that this was especially true in the case of post-dated checks,
but the court's statements are not limited in their application to post-dated checks.
3 Arguably, the knowing and obtaining requirements make the old "intent to defraud"
language superfluous. Requiring proof of intent to defraud as a separate element of the
offense placed an unnecessary burden on the prosecution. But elimination of that burden
did not change the necessity of proving the knowing and obtaining elements.
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two lies in the certainty of the issuer's knowledge. Thus, the statute describes, not the
good faith effort of Mr. Hopkins to pay his employees, but the dishonest exchange of a
check the issuer knows is bad in return for something of value such as services. The court
in Locklear expressed this point as follows: uThe inherent nature of the offense described
in sec. 943.24(1) [Wisconsin's bad check statute] is that the defendant intends to defraud
when he offers a form of legal tender knowing he does not have sufficient funds to satisfy
the obligation created at the time of the issuance of the check."
The language of the Utah statute requires knowledge that the check will not be
paid, i.e., knowledge it will never be paid. That kind of knowledge implies dishonesty, an
element which was clearly missing from this case. The statute cannot be applied to this
situation simply because Mr. Hopkins knew he was having financial troubles and warned
his employees that their checks might not clear despite all his efforts to deposit sufficient
funds to pay them.
II. "OBTAINING" IS A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE UNDER
BOTH SUBSECTIONS OF §76-6-505.
A. THE "OBTAINING" ELEMENT DISTINGUISHES THE OFFENSE
DESCRIBED IN § 76-6-505 FROM THE PAYING OF A PRE-EXISTING DEBT.
The "obtaining" element also distinguishes the crime described in Utah Criminal
Code § 76-6-505 from the situation where a person pays a pre-existing debt with a bad
check. In the later situation, the creditor has not changed positions. No new thing of value
has changed hands. A debt existed before the bad check was issued and it continues to
exist afterward. The creditor has not been deprived of anything by reason of the offense
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and is not the victim of a crime. The situation is nothing more than a failed attempt by the
debtor to pay the creditor. Criminalizing the issuance of a bad check in this situation is
seen by most courts as a violation of state constitutional provisions against imprisonment
for failure to pay a debt and a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses
of the United States Constitution.
State v. Stout, 95 S.E.2d 639, 59 ALR2d 1154 (W.Va. 1956), explains the basic
principle. The Court there held that a bad check statute did not make criminal the passing
of a check in payment of a pre-existing debt. As the court there explains, the bad check
must be the inducement for the exchange and must pass contemporaneously in
exchange for the thing of value. The annotation that follows Stout in American Law
Reports 2d indicates that most states have reached the same result even where "for the
purpose of obtaining" is not part of their statutory language. 59 ALR2d at 1161.
Utah cases are consistent with this holding. In Peterson Plumbing Supply v.
Bernson, 797 P.2d 473 (Utah 1990), the court interpreted the identical language in Utah
Code § 7-15-1, saying, "No goods were obtained from PPS in exchange for the check; the
items of value, the plumbing materials, were supplied earlier, on behalf of and at the
request of Bowers." Accordingly, no liability for the bad corporate check was found.
Phillips v. State, 136 So. 480 (Ala. 1931) specifically applied a similar Alabama
statute to the payment of wages. There, a conviction for passing a worthless check in
payment of past services was held erroneous. The court explained that when a bad check
is passed in payment for something already received by the person passing the check, it
26

becomes a credit transaction and the necessary element of criminal intent is negated. It
turns the case into one involving nothing more than the collection of a debt. The
transaction cannot be upgraded from one involving debt collection to the crime of
obtaining goods or sendees under false pretenses unless there is a contemporaneous
exchange, a dishonest act that induces one party to pass the goods or services to the
person paying with a check he knows is bad.
This principle was followed meticulously in Hindman v. State, 378 So.2d 663
(Miss. 1980), where the Court held that, because the recipient of a bad check had already
provided her services to the defendant before the check was written or delivered, the
check was not the direct inducement by means of which the services were obtained, and
the payment was made for a pre-existing debt.
In the within case, all the payroll checks were issued in payment of services that
had been performed during a pay period that ended ten days before they were issued.
Under Utah labor law, the employer (Cornerstone, not Mr. Hopkins) was already
indebted to the employees for the payment of those services at the time the pay checks
were issued. The wages for which the bad checks were issued in this case were clearly
pre-existing debts. Thus, the services in question had already been rendered to the
corporation. Mr. Hopkins was merely attempting to pay the corporate debt for those
services.
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B. THE LANGUAGE OF PURPOSE IN § 76-6-505 SHOULD NOT BE
CONSTRUED IN THE ALTERNATIVE.
Both Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) and (2) contain the following language
(emphasis added): "for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services,
wages, salary, labor, or rent." This language expresses a critical element of the offense,
the purpose for which the bad check must have been issued in order to constitute a crime
under these sections. The trial court made a finding regarding the purpose for which the
checks were issued, but in so doing it assumed an interpretation of this language that
construes it in the alternative. That interpretation allowed the court to bypass the
"obtaining" element all together in this case.
The trial court may have been aided in its misinterpretation by the fact that the
original and amended Informations both misquote the statute by adding a comma after
the words "or other thing of value." Rec. 1,17. The statutory language does not include
a comma between the phrase "or other thing of value" and the phrase "or paying for any
services," etc. That being the case, normal grammatical construction would imply that
the second phrase is not independent of the first. That is, the words "or paying for any
services," etc. was not intended to define something separate from a "thing of value," but
are intended to clarify the scope of the words "or other thing of value." Thus, under this
statute, other things of value include paying for services, wages, labor, or rent.
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The interpretation adopted by the trial court was that the second phrase is
independent and establishes another purpose under the statute, an alternative to the
purpose of "obtaining...any money, property, or other thing of value." That is, the trial
court assumed that, in order to constitute an offense under the statute, the issuer's purpose
had to be either "obtaining...any money, property, or other thing of value," or "paying
for any services, wages, labor, or rent."
This interpretation bypasses the "obtaining" element entirely in cases that involve
a bad check issued in payment of wages, while leaving the requirement intact for cases
involving a bad check issued for other things of value. This sets up a special category of
bad checks (those written to pay for wages) as to which the Supreme Court's statement in
Bartholomew (establishing the elements of the offense) supposedly does not apply.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the "or paying for any services..." language
that suggests so significant a change in the statutory scheme.
Indeed, after the 1965 amendment to this statute added the phrase "or wages for
labor performed" to the phrase "for the payment of money" a similar effort to interpret
the two phrases independently was struck down by the Utah Supreme court in the
Pfannenstiel case, infra. The Supreme Court there stated that "the addition of the word
'wages' just may have been a word of clarification, - not radical change in substantive
law." That holding applies with equal force in this instance to prevent the elimination of
a significant element of the offense.
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Notably, the trial court's interpretation is also a construction of the statute that is
less favorable to the defendant, and therefore contravenes the rule of construction first
above stated.
Similar language appears in Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(2)(a), which imposes civil
liability and fines for bad checks. It defines the Issuer as the person to be held liable and
uses the same language for that definition as is contained in § 76-6-505, namely the
"obtaining" language. However, in § 7-15-1, the wording of the language in question is
arranged very differently from the same language in § 76-6-505 {see the respective
statutes set forth above). In fact, the punctuation in the civil version would appear to
support the interpretation assumed by the trial court in this case.
However, notwithstanding the distinct punctuation in § 7-15-1, the Utah Supreme
Court in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464
(Utah 1989), construed that language "to require that the signator of a bad check
personally receive benefits, services, or money transfer...in order to be held liable" (782
P.2d at 467, emphasis added).4
Further, the Mountain States court noted: "Where possible, statutes should be
construed to be mutually consistent" (782 P.2d at 467). This consistency of construction

4 The omitted language states "or, in the alternative, have actual knowledge that the
check is drawn on insufficient funds." However, Utah Code Ann.§ 7-15-1 is a civil
liability statute, and does not include a knowledge, or mens rea, element. Therefore, the
aspect of the ruling that speaks in the alternative ("obtaining" or "knowing") is not
applicable to our analysis of Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1), which requires both
elements ("obtaining" and "knowing").
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requires that the identical language in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505 receive the same
interpretation. To rule otherwise offends common sense, for it is a strange crime indeed
that is not intended to obtain some kind of personal benefit for its perpetrator. Thus, no
matter how it is expressed grammatically, the issuer of a bad check must "personally
receive benefits, services, or money transfer" in order to be found criminality liable under
§ 76-6-505. This result is consistent, as it should be, with the description of the offense
in Bartholomew.
C. THE "OBTAINING" ELEMENT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
AVOID A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION.
The holding of Mountain States specifically mentions both goods and services,
and constitutional objections arise if the "obtaining" language is not applied to both
goods and services. To hold otherwise creates an unexpected dichotomy between bad
checks written to pay for goods and bad checks written to pay for services. This is
contrary to common sense and renders the statute vague and uncertain. The court in State
v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980), a bad check case discussed more fully below,
makes this point:
A statute defining an offense is void on the ground of "vagueness"
and is violative of due process when the conduct prohibited or permitted is
expressed in terms so vague that men differ as to its application [Citations.]
A basic thread in the fabric of our law is the time-honored principle that all
persons are presumed to know the law. Conversely, no person may be held
criminally responsible for conduct which that person could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed. 301 N.W.2d at 110.
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In the within case, it is difficult to argue that the language of the statute puts
anyone on notice that they will not be prosecuted if they pay a pre-existing debt for
goods with a bad check, but they will be prosecuted if they are paying a pre-existing debt
for service with a bad check. Nevertheless, that is the very situation that prevails in Utah
according to the trial court. Such an interpretation makes the statute vulnerable to attack
on due process grounds.
In Mountain States, the court argued that uOne of the cardinal principles of
statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing
with the subject" (782 P.2d at 466). The court further stated that we may reasonably
assume the legislature intended a fair result (782 P.2d at 467). However, it is patently
unfair to prosecute an individual who pays a pre-existing debt for services with a bad
check, while refraining from the prosecution of an individual who pays a pre-existing
debt for goods with the same bad check.
Such unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation, and the Mountain
States court was concerned about the constitutional arguments raised in that case (782
P.2d at 467), arguments that exist even more urgently in the within case because it
involves a criminal prosecution. As the court notes, if a statute can be construed so as to
avoid constitutional attack, that construction should be adopted (782 P.2d at 467).
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III. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE % 76-6-505(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A. THE FOURTEEN-DAY SAFE HAVEN IN § 76-6-505(2) RENDERS IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
There is a constitutional problem with subsection (2) as it is currently phrased. In
State v. Ohnstad, 392 N.W.2d 389 (N.D. 1986), the North Dakota court carefully
considered the constitutionality of a statute similar to Utah Criminal Code § 76-6505(2). The Ohnstad court's odyssey in arriving at its decision in that case involved a
series of cases that considered various amendments to the North Dakota statute. That
series of cases presents a body of carefully considered law that is instructive as to the
constitutionality of statutes like the Utah statute as follows:
In State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980), the Ohnstad court considered
a statute that established as a crime the issuance of a check without sufficient funds but
established as an affirmative defense the payment of the check within 30 days after
receiving written notice of nonpayment. The court reasoned as follows (301 N.W.2d at

While it is impossible for the legislature to draw classifications
equally in all cases, the classification in the criminal statute which affords a
defense only on the basis of the ability of a defendant to pay the amount of
the nonsufficient fund check calls for a standard of review greater than the
rational relationship—"rational basis"—standard...The failure to pay
[within 30 days after receiving written notice of nonpayment] results in a
criminal prosecution for commission of a felony whereas a drawer who
pays the holder of the instrument within thirty days after receiving written
notice of nonpayment is provided with an affirmative defense....
The classification contained in § 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C, is invalid
unless it serves an important state interest and the classification based upon
wealth is substantially related to that interest. [Citation.] While the state
33

interest in preventing the issuance of nonsufficient fund checks is important,
the classification based upon the ability of a defendant to pay for an
affirmative defense to criminal prosecution is not substantially related to
that interest. Thus, the classification based upon wealth constitutes a denial
of equal protection... and, therefore, § 6-08-16.2, N.D.C.C, is
constitutionally infirm.
In other words, if the state establishes that issuing a bad check is a crime, it cannot
allow the criminal to get off by simply paying the bad check. Otherwise, it is merely a
criminalized debt collection service, i.e., debtor's prison. If that is the effect of the
statutory scheme, which it was in Carpenter and it is in the case of Utah Criminal Code §
76-6-505(2), the statute violates equal protection.
In State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1981), the same court examined the
next version of North Dakota's bad check statute, focusing on its strict liability nature,
which, like Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2), does not set out a knowledge or other
mens rea requirement. The new North Dakota statute was also challenged on the basis
that it violated a provision of the North Dakota Constitution identical to Utah
Constitution, Article I, §16. This version of the statute was upheld as constitutional
because:
the penalty of imprisonment is not for failure to pay a debt, but for issuing a
check without sufficient funds...The penalty is not for failure to make
satisfaction for the check [citation]; nor does the statute provide for
dismissal of the prosecution upon payment of the check. [Citation.] (312
N.W.2d at 307).
The final incarnation of the North Dakota statute was found constitutional in State
v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1984) because it "makes no classification on the
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basis of wealth," and ''because it permitted, but did not require, a notice of dishonor to be
sent." The court also noted that subsequent payment did not constitute an affirmative
defense in the new statute. 392 N.W.2d at 391. A similar result was found in State v. Wilt,
371N.W.2dl59(N.D. 1985).
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF § 76-6-505 RENDERS IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In Ohnstad, the court overturned the same statute based on the practice of the
State Attorney's office. In so doing, the court cited the principle that a statute that is
constitutional on its face may violate equal protection in its application or effect.
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982).
In the Ohnstad case, the offending practice consisted of "sending a notice of
dishonor specifying that if the matter has not been settled within 10 days the State's
Attorney would consider criminal charges." Also, evidence showed that 70 percent of the
persons whose checks came to the attention of the State's Attorney responded to the
notices of dishonor and were not prosecuted. Over 95 percent of the persons charged with
bad check violations were people who received the notice but did not pay the check.
Further, in most cases they would not have been prosecuted if they had paid the check.
This practice was found to be indistinguishable from the situation established by the law
declared unconstitutional in Carpenter. 392 N.W.2d at 391.
In the within case, such statistics are necessary. The practice described in Ohnstad
is indistinguishable from the actual statutory language in Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-
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505(2). That language allows those who have money to pass bad checks and obtain
goods or services then avoid prosecution by covering their checks at a later time (i.e.,
within 14 days of notice of nonpayment), while the poor, who find themselves unable to
make payment within the time specified, are turned into felons whether they acted in
good faith or not. Both the rich man and the poor man have issued bad checks, but the
statute demands a difference in their prosecution based solely on their ability to make the
checks good within a specified period.
The fact that payment of the bad check negates the offense (if done within some
period of time after receiving notice of dishonor or nonpayment) is what makes the
statute unconstitutional. It is the quintessence of the problem that made the earlier North
Dakota statutes unconstitutional. Clearly, the crime punished by this subsection of the
statute is not the writing of a bad check, but the failure to satisfy that check within a
specified period of time after notice of nonpayment. That amounts to debtor's prison and
is a violation of equal protection.
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF § 76-6-505(1) RAISES
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS.
Even in the case of prosecution under Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1), the
statute is unconstitutional if, as a matter of practice, those who pay their bad checks are
not prosecuted. In the within case, everything from the judge's rejection of Mr. Hopkins'
offer to pay restitution in the form of fees or charges incurred as a result of issuing the
bad checks, to his denial of Mr. Hopkins' motion to reduce the sentence to a
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misdemeanor because Mr. Hopkins had made no payments on the bad checks (regardless
of his financial inability to do so), to his sentence requiring full payment of the checks as
restitution in the case, demonstrates beyond equivocation that the focus of the State's
prosecution is to collect the debt by threat of imprisonment. The lower court made the
crime "one for failure to pay." See, State v. Ohnstad, 392 NW2d at 392. It follows that
subsection (2) is unconstitutional in its language, and the entire section is unconstitutional
because of its application in this case.
D. APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY IN A REPRESENTATIVE SETTING
WORKS UNFAIRNESS,
Another reason to find a Due Process violation in this particular case is the fact
that Mr. Hopkins was acting in a representative capacity. The strict liability nature of
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) works great unfairness when the representative of a
corporate entity issues a check then the corporation becomes unable to cover that check.
Where the check is (a) issued in a good faith attempt to pay a pre-existing corporate debt;
(b) the future inability of the corporation to cover the check is not certain; and (c) it
occurs through no fault of the representative, it is unfair to hold the representative
personally liable, especially where he receives no personal benefit from issuing the
check.
IV.
MR. HOPKINS' DISCLOSURE TO THE EMPLOYEES NEGATED
CRIMINALITY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN A DEFENSE IN THIS CASE.
It is a basic principal of criminal law that criminal intent or mens rea is a
necessary element of all statutory crimes involving moral turpitude, even if the statute
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does not expressly make an intent to defraud an element of the crime. See 21 AmJur2d,
Criminal Law. § 129. Section 76-6-505 is no exception, as has been noted above. Thus,
circumstances which negate mens rea should be defenses in a criminal prosecution.
Disclosure by the issuer of a check to the payee at the time of issuance of the check that
the issuer lacks sufficient funds with the bank to meet the check usually purges the
transaction of its criminal character. 32 AmJur2d, False Pretenses, § 73. This principal
is often applied to prosecutions for the failure of a post-dated check to clear {see e.g.,
State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953); and State v. Trogstad, 100 P.2d
564 (Utah 1940)), but the principal is equally applicable in this case. Mr. Hopkins
disclosed the potential problems with the checks to his employees. This should have
been a complete defense to prosecution under the statute.
V. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE §§ 76-2-102 AND 103 CANNOT BE USED TO CURE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF UTAH CRIMINAL CODE § 76-6505(2).
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(1) requires a culpable mental state. Utah
Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2) does not. But, as noted in the North Dakota cases cited
above, there is no constitutional problem with a strict liability statute of this nature. It is
the 14-day deadline that establishes an unconstitutional classification. Therefore, the use
of §§ 76-2-102 and 103 to add a mens rea requirement, as the trial court did, merely adds
insult to injury.

In fact, the trial court's effort to legislate an improved statute is

specifically forbidden by Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-102 itself. Thus, the finding of
reckless disregard, the level of knowledge arbitrarily set by the trial court, is entirely
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irrelevant and unnecessary to the judgment of conviction. Moreover, that finding does
not in any way aid the State in overcoming the constitutional problems associated with
Utah Criminal Code § 76-6-505(2).
In any case, the trial court did not apply a true mens rea requirement. All it found
was the Mr. Hopkins knew the checks had been dishonored and that "having that notice,
he knowingly and recklessly failed to make good for payment within the 14 days allowed
under the statute." This is not criminal intent by any definition, especially in so far as
passing a bad check is concerned. This mental state did not occur, if it did at all, until
long after the checks were passed, when there was nothing Mr. Hopkins could do about
the problem since the corporation was in bankruptcy and he had no remaining assets from
which to pay the checks.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that a knowledge of the fact that one or more issued
checks "may not" clear is the same as knowing a specific check will not clear, as required
under § 76-6-505(1), is clear error. The trial court also erred in refusing to find a critical
element of the offense simply because the bad checks were issued in payment of wages
rather than goods. There was no obtaining in this case since it involved payments on preexisting debts. Further, Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees negates criminal intent
entirely and is a valid and complete defense. Finally, it appears that § 76-6-505(2) is
unconstitutional, and that, as it was applied in this case—the focus of prosecution being
wholly on collection of the debt—the entire statute is unconstitutional under both the
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Utah and the U.S Constitutions, and the unconstitutional nature of § 76-6-505(2) was not
ameliorated by the trial court's use of Utah Criminal Code §§ 76-2-102 and 103.
Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to
dismiss it with prejudice.

r
DATED this 5J_ day of October 2002.
Richard R. Hopkins
Appellant/Defendant
in Propria Persona
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204
AND THERE ARE TIMES IN OUR LIFE THAT COMING UP WITH $2,000 CAN
BE QUITE DIFFICULT, BUT IT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

IT'S NOT

IMPOSSIBLE IN OUR SOCIETY, IN OUR CULTURE FOR AN EDUCATED MAN
WITH DILIGENT EFFORT TO LOCATE, BORROW —
SUGGEST STEALING —
LEGITIMATELY.

I'M NOT GOING TO

BUT BORROW OR OTHERWISE LOCATING FUNDS

AND IT WAS RECKLESS FOR HIM TO ALLOW THE CHECKS

AND THEN NOT BE MORE DILIGENT TO GET THEM COVERED.
THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

THOUGH I'VE LISTENED

CAREFULLY TO THE EVIDENCE AS IT CAME IN.

I'VE LISTENED

CAREFULLY TO YOUR ARGUMENTS AS YOU PRESENTED THEM.

I'M AWARE

OF THE STATUTE AND I'M AWARE OF THE COURT'S REVIEWING PRIOR
TO TODAY'S TRIAL.
I THINK I'M PROBABLY IN AS GOOD A POSITION RIGHT NOW AS I
WILL BE AT ANY TIME TO MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED.

IT'S FRESH IN MY MIND NOW

AS IT WILL EVER BE.
MY BEST VIEW OF THIS, FOLKS, IS THAT, FIRST OF ALL, I
THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY AS COUNSEL'S ARGUED THAT MR. HOPKINS
IS A VERY INTELLIGENT MAN, VERY HIGHLY EDUCATED, IS A VERY
EXPERIENCED BUSINESSMAN BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY.

AND MY BEST

VIEW IS THAT AS PRESIDENT OF THIS CORPORATION HE WAS
RESPONSIBLE —

THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUANCE OR

PASSING OF THESE PAYROLL CHECKS.
NOW, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND UNDER THE LAW
THAT'S SET OUT IN 76-2-205, I FIND THAT IN THAT CAPACITY HE

205
WAS THE PERSON WHO ISSUED OR PASSED EACH OF THESE CHECKS, HAD
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE OR PASS THEM.

AND AS THE AGENT OF THE

CORPORATION DID IT, EVEN WITH REGARD TO THAT CHECK THAT MAY BE
HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW'S SIGNATURE AS HE'S TESTIFIED, THAT
ULTIMATELY IT WAS HE WHO ISSUED AND PASSED THAT CHECK FOR
PAYROLL THAT WAS HONESTLY DUE AND OWING IN AN AMOUNT THAT WAS
THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS AFTER.
THE PURPOSE OF EACH OF THE CHECKS AT ISSUE WAS A PURPOSE
SET OUT IN 76-505-1 AND 2; THAT IS, PAYING FOR WAGES, SALARY,
LABOR.

AND WITH REGARD TO SUBSECTION 2, THE ISSUE IS WHETHER

HE KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE.

AND AS I REVIEW

STATE'S EXHIBITS 1, 2, AND 3, THE BANK STATEMENTS THAT SHOW
NUMEROUS BOUNCED CHECKS IN DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AS
I REVIEW THE TESTIMONY THAT ~

THAT NUMEROUS EMPLOYEES WERE

TOLD THAT, YOU KNOW, DON'T TRY TO CASH THIS.
WE'RE CONFIDENT IT WILL PASS.
THERE WAS A PROBLEM.

JUST DEPOSIT IT.

THAT SHOWED KNOWLEDGE THAT

AND I THINK IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW

KNOWLEDGE THAT ANY GIVEN CHECK MAY NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE.
THERE SEEMED TO BE A SUGGESTION THAT THE CRIME WAS
COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEES FOR NOT FOLLOWING STRICTLY THE
DIRECTIONS OF DEPOSITING THEM RATHER THAN TRYING TO CASH THEM
OR WAITING SOME TIME BEFORE THEY DEPOSIT THEM.

AND I GUESS I

JUST DON'T SEE IT THAT WAY.
IT'S CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THESE TWO CHECKS, THEY WERE
REFUSED BY THE DRAWEE AND THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS KNOWING.

ZUb

IT WAS ALSO EXTREMELY RECKLESS WITH REGARD TO THE STATE OF THE
BUSINESS AS TESTIFIED TO DURING THE TIME AT ISSUE, FEBRUARY OF
2001.

AND I FIND THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 1 OF

76-6-505 HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
WITH REGARD TO 2, WE'VE ALREADY COVERED SOME OF THE
ELEMENTS, AND WE DROP DOWN TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER HE LATER
RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN MADE GOOD.
AND I DO FIND THAT WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE TWO CHECKS HE
HAD RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE CHECK'S NONPAYMENT.

WITH

REGARD TO THE EARLIER CHECK, NOTICE CAME FROM A LETTER BY
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION.

WITH REGARD TO BOTH OF THE

CHECKS, THERE WAS NOTICE PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYEE, MISS
VANISI, THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN PAID.

AND I ACCEPT YOUR

TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO THAT, AND MAKE IT FINDINGS OF THE
COURT.
HAVING THAT NOTICE, HE KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY FAILED TO
MAKE GOOD FOR PAYMENT WITHIN THE 14 DAYS ALLOWED UNDER THE
STATUTE.

AND I FIND ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 2 HAVE

BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
BASED ON THOSE FINDINGS AND IN LIGHT OF THE AMENDED
INFORMATION THAT IS FILED BY THE STATE, I DO FIND THAT THERE
HAS BEEN A SINGLE VIOLATION OF 7 6-6-505 AND WILL ENTER A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION TO A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY BASED ON THAT.
I WILL SET SENTENCING IN THE MATTER —

LET'S SEE.

MR. DRAKE, HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CALENDAR WITH YOU?
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